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A.: Torts--Assumption of Risk and Contributory Negligence as Separate
CASE COMMENTS

there must be an actual allocation of the selling price to the respective portions of the property as if there were two separate transactions. Rev. Rul. 286, 1953-2 Cum. BuLL. 20.
It is submitted that by application of these regulations the
transaction in the principal case can be construed as a sale of a
principal residence, with an apportionment of the "boot" received
in the exchange between the residence and the other property. This
would allocate 90/902 of the "boot" received, or $1,516.63, to the
residence, and the remainder allocable to the farm exchanged, making the taxable gain to the taxpayer as a result of the exchange of
like property held for productive use $13,683.37, the amount which
the government contended was correct.
It is contended that the government has provided, in the regulations herein discussed, applicable regulations for this exchange,
and that a consideration of them would lend support to the contention made by the government in this novel fact situation.
M. D. W., Jr.
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and P, residents of Florida, were planning
a trip to D's cabin at a lake resort in North Carolina. Upon arrival
at the resort but prior to going to D's cabin, P and D went to the
lakeside in D's truck, towing the latter's motorboat on a trailer which
was attached to the truck by an old and worn cable. D was familiar
with the launching procedure but P was not. When they attempted
to launch the boat, the truck bogged down, and after several unsuccessful attempts to free the boat and truck, D requested that P
push on the rear of the truck as he, D, attempted to pull it forward.
In the process the cable snapped and severed P's foot. In an action
for negligent tort the federal district court, sitting without a jury,
found for P. Held, on appeal, that D was guilty of actionable negligence in using the cable and in failing to warn P, and that P was not
guilty of contributory negligence in standing near the rear of the
truck at D's request. Ferguson v. Smith, 257 F.2d 694 (4th Cir.
1958).
SFPAiATE DEFNSES.-D

The court in the principal case concluded that the plaintiff was
not a social guest at D's home as they were not on D's property at
the time of the accident Thus P was not a licensee.
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The court in concluding that P was not guilty of contributory
negligence ruled out what is possibly the most common defense in a
negligent tort action. Contributory negligence is conduct on the
part of the plaintiff, which, because he has fallen below the standard
of care required of him, has contributed, in a legal sense, to the
harm that has befallen him. RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 463 (1934). Contributory negligence is to be distinguished from negligence in its
normal interpretation in that the former is conduct by one which
creates an unreasonable risk of harm, in a legal sense, to himself,
whereas the latter is the creation of an unreasonable risk of harm
toward someone other than the actor himself. Pappasv. Evans, 242
Iowa 804,48 N.W.2d 298 (1951). The presence of contributory negligence will bar the plaintiff's action for damages in a majority of
jurisdictions. See PlossER, TORTS § 55 (2d ed. 1955).
On the facts of the principal case, it would seem that P might
have been guilty of contributory negligence if his -injuy could have
resulted from a failure to discover or appreciate a risk which would
have been apparent to a reasonable, prudent man exercising reasonable care, but the court resolved this issue in favor of P, indicating that P acted as a reasonable man.
A defense that is closely analogous to contributory negligence
and is also a very common defense in negligence tort actions is the
defense of assumption of risk. The court spoke of this defense only
indirectly and in such a fashion as to lead one to believe that it was
identical to contributory negligence. However, while under certain
circumstances the plaintiff may by the same acts or omissions be
guilty of both contributory negligence and assumption of risk, still
there is a definite distinction. Heureux v. Hurley, 117 Conn. 347, 168
Atl. 8 (1938). The plaintiff may assume the risk voluntarily if the
dangers are known even though he exercises due care. Hunn v.
Windsor Hotel Co., 119 W. Va. 215, 193 S.E. 57 (1937); Heureux v.
Hurley, supra. In the Hunn case, supra, the court in the syllabus
said:
"Assumption of risk and contributory negligence are not
convertible terms, though sometimes used as such. The essence
of contributory negligence is carelessness; of assumption of risk,
venturousness. Thus, an injured person may not have acted
carelessly; in fact, may have exercised the utmost care, yet may
have assumed, voluntarily, a known hazard. If so, he must accept the consequence. This doctrine has developed from the
maxim, volenti non fit injuria. It rests on two premises: first,
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that the nature and extent of the risk are fully appreciated; and
second, that it is voluntarily incurred. It was formerly confined
by many courts to cases where a contractual relation existed.
That limitation is generally no longer regarded."
Thus, assumption of risk consists of a mental state of willingness and
knowledge, whereas contributory negligence is a matter of conduct.
Landrum v. Roddy, 148 Neb. 984, 12 N.W.2d 82 (1948); Peoples
Drug Stores v. Windham, 178 Md. 172, 12 A.2d 532 (1940).
Assumption of risk can arise out of contract by express agreement or may be implied from the action and conduct of the parties.
As there was no contractual relation in the principal case, then if
the defense existed it arose by implication. Professor Prosser states
that assumption of risk whether it be express or implied means:
"By entering freely and voluntarily into any relation or situation
which presents obvious danger, the plaintiff may be taken to accept
it and to agree that he will look out for himself and relieve the
defendant of responsibility." PnossER, ToRTs § 55 (2d ed. 1955).
It would seem, therefore, that this statement would be qualified to
the extent that if the defendant is guilty of gross negligence, the
plaintiff will not be held to have assumed the risk since gross negligence, in the ordinary case, is seldom anticipated, and it is clear that
unless it definitely appears from the plaintiff's words and conduct
that he does consent to relieve the defendant of his obligation to
act toward the plaintiff as a reasonable man he will not be held to
have assumed the risk. Ridgeway v. Yenny, 228 Ind. 16, 57 N.E.2d
581 (1944). Thus, since D's negligence in the principal case may
be said to have approached gross negligence, then it may be said P
did not assume the risk.
While the court reached a just verdict, the distinction between
D's two principal defenses could have been more clearly indicated.
G. H. A.

TORTS-hzTUvEnNG CAusE--LiBmr oF OmiNAL ToR'rFAsoR
FOR SUBSEQUENT DAmAGES TO PnOPERnTY BY A REPAiBM AN.-D char-

tered a barge from P, a barge owner. During the period of the

charter the barge was damaged through the negligence of D in navigating through ice floes encountered during a journey. P and D
agreed that the barge should be delivered to a drydock where it
was to be repaired. Five days after redelivery, while the barge
was being placed in drydock, cakes of ice became lodged, through
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